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This paper describes a spreadsheet-level model for analyzing attacks by a small, 
mixed collection of ICBMs, perhaps including decoys, on a set of targets individually 
defended by terminal ABMs. The central questions are how a fixed supply of ABMs 
should be divided up among the targets, and the resulting effectiveness of the optimized 
defense.  All ABMs are assumed perfect in the sense that each ABM eliminates the 
reentry vehicle at which it is aimed.  Since the ABM assignments are apparent to the 
attacker, he can “soak them up” by presenting the appropriate number of his least 
effective reentry vehicles to the subject target.  The target is then vulnerable to any 
remaining “bangs” among the attackers. 
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Analyses of the terminal defense of a set of targets by anti-ballistic missiles are 
generally conducted under the assumption that all attacking reentry vehicles are identical.  
This paper generalizes to the case where the attacking arsenal is mixed, the main 
motivation being that a mixed attacking arsenal can contain decoys that are harmless to 
targets, but which can still “soak up” defenders.  All defenders are assumed to be perfect, 
and the main focus of the paper is on cases where the attack is comparatively weak.  A 
kind of Prim-Read defense results.  A simple method for deriving an upper bound on 
damage is described and illustrated. 
Introduction 
As nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them by ballistic missiles proliferate 
(Feickert, 2004), it becomes increasingly likely that a credible threat to use them might 
eventually be made or even carried out.  Concern about this has led to various proposals 
for defense against small ICBM attacks, with anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) being the 
centerpiece. For example, on December 17, 2002, the President of the United States gave 
ABM development for such contingencies as a justification for withdrawing from the 
1972 ABM treaty (Bush, 2002).  See Missile Defense Agency (2004) for an overview of 
the current United States ballistic missile defense program. 
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This paper introduces a method for assessing the effectiveness of terminal ABMs 
for defending against an attack by ICBMs carrying a mixture of reentry vehicles (RVs) of 
different types.  All of these RVs are assumed to be indistinguishable to the defense when 
assigning ABMs.  The primary reason for considering a mixture of RVs is to allow for 
decoys, which can be thought of as RVs with no effectiveness against targets.  There is 
also, of course, the possibility that the RVs are not decoys, but simply differ in 
effectiveness. 
We assume throughout that ABMs are perfect in the sense that each ABM will 
reliably eliminate one RV.  The simplicity of this assumption will make it easier to 
explore the real focus of our inquiry, which is the mixed nature of the attack.  If the RVs 
are not mixed, then there are existing methods where the assumption of ABM perfection 
is not necessary (Burr, et al., 1985).   
ICBMs are vulnerable in their boost, midcourse (exoatmospheric) and terminal 
phases.  Boost phase intercepts are in a sense ideal, since the ICBM is destroyed before it 
can deploy its payload, but difficult to carry out.  Terminal defenses benefit from the 
effect of the atmosphere, which strips away some of the decoys that are effective outside 
of the atmosphere.  Midcourse (exoatmospheric) ABMs offer the flexibility of being able 
to defend many targets, rather than just one.  Effective defensive systems can be 
constructed out of the joint use of both midcourse and terminal ABMs, although such 
systems are comparatively difficult to design and study. Miercort and Soland (1971) 
study the attack of such a system under the assumption that all interceptors (midcourse 
and terminal) are perfect, taking the defensive assignments as given.  Our ambition is to 
solve a two-sided problem with a mixed attack, so we make the simplifying assumption 
 3
that all ABMs are terminal, except possibly for a midcourse ABM system whose reach 
includes all targets, and which is also perfect.   
To some extent, the mixed context justifies our assumption that ABMs are 
perfect, which is operationally equivalent to assuming that ABMs are sufficiently 
threatening that the attacker chooses to neutralize them with decoys or small RVs, rather 
than subjecting one of his more powerful RVs to possible intercept.   
Even though the atmosphere is an ally in stripping away light decoys, it is still 
possible to design functional terminal decoys.  Such decoys are heavy enough to displace 
other RVs, so the attacker has a payload tradeoff to make between firepower and dilution 
of terminal ABM defenses.  This tradeoff is central to our problem.  
General Analysis 
Terminal ABMs must wait until incoming RVs are close to their targets before 
attempting an intercept.  Operationally, “close” means that ABMs must be assigned to 
individual targets, with no possibility that an ABM assigned to one target can defend 
another.  The attacker must similarly partition his forces, with the outcome at each target 
depending only on the forces assigned to that target.   
The sequence in which the assignments are made, and the knowledge that each 
side has when making assignments, are crucial.  Each side would, of course, prefer to 
make its assignments knowing the assignments that have already been made by the other. 
The scenario most favorable to the defense is when the ABM force can examine the 
whole attack, all at once, before committing any ABMs.  Given the difficulty of 
determining the attacker’s ultimate intention when the first ICBM is launched, this 
assumption is rarely made.  Our analysis here is based on the opposite assumption, where 
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the physical deployment of ABMs is observable and reveals to the attacker the extent to 
which targets are being defended.  The intermediate case where both sides must commit 
forces without knowing the other’s intention is a kind of Blotto game (Washburn, 2003) 
that generally goes by the name of “pre-allocation” (Eckler and Burr, 1972; Bracken, et 
al, 1987).  In a preallocated defense, a secret but fixed number of interceptors is 
irrevocably committed to each target.  If the number of attackers exceeds that number , 
then further interceptors are not committed, even if the command and control system 
would permit it.  This seems unlikely when discussing a defense against small attacks.  
Besides, Blotto analyses have been performed only for homogeneous attacking forces, 
and we have no useful generalization to offer. 
When the attacker has the last move, the best that the defense can hope for is that 
his ABMs will eliminate the most powerful attacking weapons, one for one.  If the 
defense also incorporates the idea that no attacking RV will be deliberately allowed to 
penetrate while the means of intercepting it are still available, as we assume to be the 
case, then the best that can be hoped for is that the ABMs will intercept the least effective 
RVs.  The reason for this is that the attacker can always ensure that result by attacking 
each target at its known defense level, using the least effective RVs, before going on to 
attack the now undefended targets with more powerful RVs.  The defense may be even 
less effective, since heavily defended targets may simply be ignored by the attacker while 
undefended or lightly defended targets are overwhelmed.  In that case some ABMs might 
eliminate no attackers at all.  We call situations where some ABMs are wasted in this 
manner “defense dominant”, since they characterize the attack of a strong defense by a 
weak attacker.  It is defense dominant situations that are our primary concern. 
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In the defense dominant case, it is natural for the defense to plan his ABM 
allocations in such a manner that the attacker sees no weak spots, in the sense that there 
are no targets where there is a large return per attacker.  Such defenses are called Prim-
Read (Read, 1958; Karr, 1981; Burr, et al, 1985) defenses, for which there are well 
known optimal allocation methods when all attackers are identical.  Our intention is to 
generalize this work so that the attackers can differ in terms of the amount of target 
killing power. 
The killing power of a nuclear arsenal has a number of measures.  One is a simple 
count of the numbers of warheads.  Nuclear arms limitation treaties deal mainly with this 
measure, since it is the easiest to verify.  Other measures depend on the yield (Y, in 
megatons) and accuracy C (“circular error probable” in nautical miles) of the warheads.  
Y2/3 is the warhead’s Equivalent MegaTons (EMT), essentially a measure of the amount 
of two-dimensional area that can be covered lethally.  EMT measures a warhead’s 
capability to kill soft countervalue targets such as urban areas.  Y2/3 /C2 is a warhead’s 
Counter Military Potential (CMP), a measure of its ability to kill hardened point targets.  
Both CMP and EMT are cumulative measures; that is, the effectiveness of an arsenal is 
just the total effectiveness of the RVs composing it.  During the Cold War, the arsenals of 
the United states and the Soviet Union differed strongly in these measures, with the 
United States (Soviet Union) having more CMP (EMT) (Current News, 1976). 
The most natural measure of power for a small attack is probably EMT, but we do 
not wish to be specific, so we refer in the sequel to a general cumulative measure called 
“bangs” that could be either EMT or CMP.  However, a bang must be one thing or the 
other; that is, the target set cannot consist of a mixture of hard and soft targets.  If the 
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target set is mixed in that manner, then both the total EMT and CMP of the attacker’s 
arsenal are important, and the method described below will not apply.  
The attacker’s arsenal is to be expended in attacking a collection of targets 
indexed by i, each of which has an associated value function Vi(x) that represents 
“expected value killed if the target is undefended and attacked by x bangs”. If target i is 
defended by d perfect ABMs, then the first d attacking RVs will be eliminated, and only 
the bangs associated with RVs in excess of d will affect the target.  The first d attackers 
“soak up” the ABMs, so it is useful to think of each RV as possessing a single “soak”, in 
addition to its bangs.  Obviously, if the vehicles differ bangwise, then the attacker will 
use small ones (especially decoys) to soak up the defense.  Since the defenses are 
assumed known when the attack is being optimized, our object is to calculate the 
minimum (over defenses) of the maximum (over attacks) of the total target value killed, 
or, more concisely, the min max value. 
The numbers of ABMs and soaks are required to be integer-valued, but the 
number of bangs possessed by an RV can be any nonnegative number.  Every RV has 
exactly one soak, but the number of bangs depends on the physical system of units in 
use  — an RV with only .01 bangs might actually be very powerful.  The total supply of 
bangs is assumed to be infinitely divisible, so that a given quantity of bangs can be 
distributed arbitrarily over the targets.  This assumption makes most sense when there is a 
diversity of RVs, but is uniformly employed below without further inquiry into the 
question of diversity.  In essence, once the set of targets at which the defenses have been 
soaked up is determined (this set automatically includes all undefended targets), the 
attacker is free to allocate the total bangs of all remaining RVs to that set of targets.   
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We first consider the case where only two types of RV are available to the 
attacker, one being decoys.  The mix of RVs is subject to a linear payload constraint, but 
is otherwise determinable after the defense has been observed by the attacker.  The 
constraint is b+λs≤B, where b and s are the number of bangs and soaks, respectively.  
Parameter B is the total ICBM payload measured in bangs, and each decoy displaces λ 
bangs, where λ is some positive constant.  We refer to this as the “free” case, since the 
attacker is assumed free to determine s (a nonnegative integer) and b (a nonnegative real 
number) after observing the defenses.  We will then consider “constrained” problems 
where the attacking arsenal is a given, arbitrary mixture of vehicle types.  The allocation 
of the attacking arsenal can be made after observing the defenses even in the constrained 
case, but the arsenal itself is considered fixed and known to the defense. 
The following two examples of the free case illustrate the attack dominant and 
defense dominant cases. 
 
Example 1:  Suppose there are a small target and a large target, with the two 
value functions being V1(x) = (1 - exp( - x)) and V2(x) = 2(1 - exp( - x)).  There are four 
ABMs, and the attacker is constrained by b + 0.5s ≤ 3.  It is easy to show that the 
optimal defense is to use all four ABMs to defend the second target.  Even knowing this 
distribution, the attacker should still soak up all four ABMs and use his remaining bang 
to achieve 1.285, splitting the bang (0.15, 0.85) between the two targets.  If the attacker 
does not soak up all four ABMs, he can achieve at most 1 by attacking the first target.   
If the attacker actually had six identical RVs with 0.5 bang each, then the best 
“split” of the bang remaining after soaking up the four ABMs would be to use the whole 
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bang on target 2, this being better than the (0.5, 0.5) split achieved using one RV on each 
target.  However, as mentioned earlier, we assume that bangs can be split arbitrarily 
among the targets, even in small examples such as this one.   
Example 2:  This is the same example except that B = 2; i.e., b + 0.5s ≤ 2.  
Against the same defense, the attacker would ignore the second target, achieving 
1 - exp( - 2) = 0.865 on the first.  The best defense is to assign 1 ABM to the first target 
and 3 to the second.  The best attack is then on the second target, with the payoff being 
2(1 – exp( – 0.5)) = 0.787.  This is the min max total value killed.  Unlike example 1, this 
example is defense dominant because at least one defended target is not attacked when 
both sides allocate optimally.  
General analysis of the free case 
Let T be the set of targets, let D be the total number of ABMs, and let the min 
max value of the payoff to the attacker from attacking T be M(B,D).  Thus D = 4 and 
M(3,4) = 1.285 in example 1, or M(2,4) = 0.787 in example 2.  Our object is to find a 
general upper bound for M(B,D). 
The problem of optimally allocating bangs when D = 0 is a separable, concave 
maximization problem.  It closely resembles the search theory problem of allocating 
search effort to a set of places where a target might be, so a variety of efficient solution 
techniques is known (see Washburn(1981), or more generally Ibaraki and Katoh (1988)).  
If S is any subset of the targets, let the maximum total value achievable with B bangs 
when the targets are undefended be V(S,B).  For convenience, we define V(S,B)≡0 for 
B<0. 
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If a target is defended by d ABMs, then the attacker should either soak up all d of 
them before applying bangs, or else ignore the target entirely.  Therefore, once the set of 
targets to be attacked has been selected and the price of admission paid in soaks, the 
attacker faces the concave optimization problem described above.  Formally, let I(S) be 
the number of interceptors assigned to target subset S.  The function I() is to be chosen by 
the defense, subject only to the constraint that no more than D interceptors can be used in 
defending the whole target set T.  Once the defense is committed, the attacker chooses a 
subset S to attack.  Thus 




Since the attacker is free to attack the entire target set, it follows from (1) that 
M(B,D)≥V(T,B - λD), with equality holding in the attack dominant case.  Theorem 1 
gives circumstances where equality must hold. 
Theorem 1: Suppose that Vi(0)=0 and Vi(x) is an increasing value function for 
x ≥0, with > 0, for i=1,…,n.  Then there exists a B* such that the 
attack is dominant for B>B*. 
*lim ( )x iV x V→∞ ≡
Proof:  Let V V  Since V(T,B) increases with B 
to VTOT, there exists some B* such that V(T, B* - λD) > VTOT - Vi*. For B > B*, the 
attacker can gain more than VTOT - Vi* by engaging the entire target set T, whereas he will 
gain at most that amount by engaging any set of targets that does not include i*.  
Therefore target i* must be attacked, and an optimal defense is to concentrate all D 
ABMs on i*.  All D ABMs will be soaked up, so the attack is dominant.  QED 
* *
1
,  and let arg max .
n







In examples 1 and 2, with parameters other than B as specified, B* is at most 3 
and at least 2. 
Except in attack dominant cases, B* will be greater than B.  M(B,D) could still be 
determined using (1), but the number of evaluations of V() could easily be very large.  If 
there are N targets, then the number of possible defenses is the number of combinations 
of N+D – 1 things taken D at a time.  For each of these defenses, 2N - 1 attacks must be 
considered unless B is small enough to make the attack of some target subsets infeasible.  
If N = 10 and D = 10, the total number of evaluations would be (92,378)(1,023), 
approximately 108.  Even though any given evaluation of V() is not difficult, this 
combinatorial explosion will make an exact evaluation of M(B,D) difficult in even 
moderately large problems. 
Our interest is mostly in the defense dominant case, which is characterized by the 
attacker ignoring some targets and looking for cheap victories at others.  We will find an 
upper bound on M(B,D) by having the defense control the return per bang that is 
available to the attacker.  If the target is defended by d ABMs, and if the attacker chooses 
to soak up those ABMs and commit an additional x bangs, then the return per bang 
(converting the soaks into bangs at the rate λ) is Vi(x)/(x+λdi).  If the return per bang is to 
be bounded above by r>0, then it is necessary that Vi(x)/(x+λdi) ≤  r for all x, or, 
equivalently, that λdi ≥ Fi(r), where  
 0( ) max { ( ) / }i x iF r V x r x≥≡ − . (2) 
The function Fi(r) exists and decreases from ∞ to 0 on the interval (0, ∞), as long as Vi(x) 
is as specified in Theorem 1.  We can now define the smallest return per bang that is 
permitted by an inventory of D ABMs when the cost of a soak is λ > 0: 
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 , (3) 
where  is the smallest integer that is not smaller than z; i.e., z rounded up.  If the set 
over which the minimum is taken is empty, we take r(λ,D) = ∞.  Since Fi(r) approaches 
infinity monotonically as r approaches 0, a finite minimum will be found somewhere in 
(0, ∞) as long as λ>0. The individual terms of the sum in (3) are the defense levels di that 
are required to assure r(λ,D).  A notable feature of this defense is that it does not require 
knowing B.  Indeed, this feature is sometimes taken to be definitive of the Prim-Read 
defense   
1




r D r F r Dλ
=
≡   ∑ λ ≤
z  
Figure 1 shows a plot of the sum in (3) versus r for Examples 1 and 2.  When 
λ = 0.5, the smallest value of r for which the sum is smaller than the given number of 
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Figure 1: Showing the total number of ABMs required (D) versus the return 
per bang (r) in examples 1 and 2. 
Once r(λ,D) is obtained, the upper bound is obtained by multiplying by B: 
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 ( , ) ( , )M B D Br Dλ≤  (4) 
This bound is 1.560 in example 1, or 1.040 in example 2, compared to the true values of 
1.285 and 0.787.   
Our contention is that the upper bound is only slightly larger than the true min 
max value in defense dominant problems where there are many targets of different types.  
We have given little evidence of this so far, since 1.040 is not a particularly good 
approximation to 0.787 in Example 2.  But consider what happens when Example 2 is 
scaled up so that there are two targets of each type, two “small” and two “large”, with B 
and D each likewise doubled.  If the defense chooses to defend both small targets with 1 
ABM each, and both large targets with 3 ABMs each, then the attacker should attack one 
target of each type, leaving him with 2 bangs after soaking up four ABMs.  The small 
target should get 0.65 bangs and the large target 1.35 bangs, for a total score of 
0.48 + 1.48 = 1.96. Furthermore, any defense must leave some pair of small and large 
targets with at most 4 ABMs between them, so the attacker can do at least this well 
regardless of the defense (if two ABMs are assigned to each target, for example, the 
attacker could attack both large targets and achieve 2.53).  Thus M(B,D) = 1.96.  The 
upper bound in this scaled-up problem is 2.08, only 6% larger than M(B,D). 
Intuitively, the attacker has so many choices of what set of targets to attack in 
large problems that he is almost bound to be able to partition his force so that each attack 
is carried out at a level that achieves nearly r(λ,D) per attacker.  Further evidence of this 
phenomenon is shown in Figure 2, which shows the best possible return per attacker in a 
problem where there are 10 identical “small” targets, 10 ABMs, and λ=0.5.  The ABMs 
should of course be distributed one per target.  The best possible return per attacker is 
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then r(0.5,10) = 0.424, achieved when the attacker uses 0.858 bangs per attacked target 
after soaking up the single ABM, a total of 1.358 bangs of payload per attacked target.  
With only a small total payload, say B = 1, the attacker has no choice but to attack one 
target by soaking up its ABM and then assigning 0.5 bangs, which is inefficient.  On the 
other hand, the return per attacker is maximal when B is nearly a multiple of 1.358, or 
when B is large enough to allow some flexibility in the number of targets attacked.  Once 
B is large enough to make attacking all targets optimal, the defense is no longer dominant 
and the concavity of the value functions causes the return per attacker to begin 
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Figure 2: Return per attacker in a problem with 10 identical targets.  The 
defense is dominant for B≤13. 
The actual optimization problem faced by the attacker for a given defense is 
separable, but the presence of a defense complicates the solution because of the “buy-in” 
cost of soaking up the interceptors.  A variety of methods are available (see Ibaraki and 
Katoh, 1988) for solving such problems, but, since our object is merely to show that the 
results of this optimization will be close to the upper bound when the defense is 
dominant, we content ourselves with (4). 
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Fixed Arsenal analysis 
So far we have been assuming that the attacker is free, after observing the 
defense, to convert bangs into soaks at the rate λ.  In this section, we assume instead that 
the attacker possesses a fixed arsenal of RVs, each with specified numbers of bangs in the 
interval [βmin, βmax].  For example, the attacker might have 10 RVs with a total of 8 
bangs, the bang vector being β=(0, 0, 0, 0.4, 0.8, 0.8, 1, 1, 2, 2).  Here βmin = 0 and  
βmax = 2.The first three RVs are decoys, with the rest listed in order of increasing bang 
measure.  The problem is otherwise as described in the introductory section, with a fixed 
number D of perfect ABMs and a value function for each target.  The bang vector is 
assumed known to the defense.  Let the min max value killed by the attacker be M(β,D). 
The attacker still has the problem of overcoming defenses, and should use the 
least powerful RVs, beginning with the decoys, to do so.  A given RV can be used either 
for its bangs or its soaks, but not both, so there is a tradeoff between the two measures.  
The efficient frontier can be shown as a concave relationship between bangs and soaks.  
Figure 3 shows such a diagram for the example above, together with one of many 
possible tangents.  The point of tangency is one where the first 8 RVs are used as soaks, 
with the last two contributing 4 bangs. As before, we assume that the bangs can be 



















Figure 3:  The tradeoff between bangs and soaks in an example with 10 RVs. 
 
Consider a relaxation of the attacker’s problem where the efficient frontier is 
replaced by one of its tangents.  Since the tangent lies entirely above the efficient frontier, 
any solution of the relaxed problem is an upper bound on the total value that the attacker 
can kill.  Let the expression of the tangent curve be b + λs ≤ B(λ), where B(λ) is the 
vertical intercept and -λ is the slope.  Since this is the same form as the “free” problem 
considered earlier, it follows that M(β,D) ≤ B(λ)r(λ,D).  Since λ is an arbitrary number 
in the interval [βmin, βmax], it follows that  
 
min max
( , ) min ( ) ( , )M D Bβ λ β r Dβ λ λ≤ ≤≤  (5) 
Formula 5 is the desired upper bound on the min max value in the constrained case. 
 
Example 3:  This is the same as example 1 except that there are three small and 
three large targets, D = 12, and the bang vector β is as given above and shown in Figure 3. 
The minimizing value for λ is 1, which corresponds to a defense where large (small) 
targets are defended by 3(1) ABMs.  Since r(1,D) = 0.348 and B(1) = 12, 
M(β,D) ≤ 4.176 according to (5). Against that defense, the best attack is against 1 small 
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and 2 large targets, which requires 7 soaks and leaves the 3 largest RVs.  Distributing the 
5 associated bangs optimally over the three targets produces a total value killed of 
M(β,D) = 4.101, slightly smaller than the bound. 
Given the lack of variety in the targets, this comparison between value and bound 
could be made worse by postulating a number of defenders that is not a multiple of 3.  
Suppose D = 14 instead of 12.  The computation of r(λ,D) does not change, since it is 
based on the target that is easiest to attack, so neither does the bound. There are 2 ABMs 
left over whose use is not guided by theory.  If these two are allocated to large targets, so 
that two of the large targets have 4 ABMs each, then the attacker should ignore both of 
those targets, attacking the other large target and the three small ones.  This will achieve 
3.938 in total, while the bound is still 4.176.  If the leftover ABMs are used in any other 
way, the attacker can still achieve 4.101, so the two leftovers should indeed be allocated 
to large targets.  If D=13, then neither the bound nor M(β,D) changes; that is, the 
thirteenth ABM is useless against the postulated attack. 
An extended example of the free type 
We consider here an extended example, assuming a defense dominant scenario 
with the United States being the defender.  The threatened nuclear attack is to be entirely 
against urban areas, with the goal being to cause as many casualties as possible.  We 
assume that each equivalent megaton will cover 58 km2 lethally (SPARTA (2001)), so 
the attacker should seek to attack urban areas with a high population density.   
Table 1 shows the population and area of the five largest Continuously Built up 
Urban Areas (CBUA) in the United States according to Demographia (2003).  We 
assume that the population is uniformly distributed over the stated area; that assumption 
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is significantly wrong, but still sufficient for our purposes here.  We also assume that all 
CBUAs are within reach of the attackers.  If an undefended CBUA has population P and 
area A in km2, then the value function when x EMT are allocated is VLIN(x)=P min(1, 
58x/A).  This (truncated) linear function incorporates the implicit assumptions that edge 
effects and the difficulty of covering a region with circles can be ignored, and that RVs 
are perfectly accurate.  For comparison we also analyze the exponential value function 
VEXP(x) = P(1 − exp(−58x/A)).  The exponential case assumes a poorly coordinated attack 
where the area covered by x EMT is randomly distributed within the CBUA.  The two 
cases should bracket the practical case where RVs are aimed in the presence of targeting 
errors.  In general 0≤ VEXP(x)≤ VLIN(x). 
Assume first that there are 100 ABMs (D=100), and that the linear case applies.  
Using (2) and (3), we find that r(0.5,D)=110,959 and r(0.25,D)=120,317, with 
corresponding ABM distributions as shown in Table 1.  If there were no ABMs, the 
largest number of casualties per EMT would be 158,278, obtained by attacking Los 
Angeles.  Thus, the presence of ABMs has the effect of reducing the number of casualties 
per EMT available to the attacker.  As λ decreases, the ABMs tend to be concentrated on 
the most vulnerable target, and the overall effect of the ABM defense decreases because 
it becomes increasingly easy to soak them up with decoys.  The total number of casualties, 
of course, depends on the unspecified magnitude of the attack. 
If λ is held constant at 0.5 while D is varied in the linear case, the dotted curve in 
Figure 4 results.  By the time D=3000, the first 61 CBUAs are defended, rather than only 
the first 5.  Those 61 include Washington, DC and finally Atlanta.  It takes about 1000 
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ABMs to reduce the casualty rate by a factor of 2, compared to no defense.  Further 
increases in the number of ABMs have increasingly small effects.   
CBUA Population Area (km2) ABMs 
Los Angeles 11,789,000 4,320 64 (94) 
San Francisco-San Jose 5,479,000 2,582 10 (5) 
Miami  1,915,000 914 3 (1) 
New York 17,800,000 8,684 22 (0) 
New Orleans 1,009,000 513 1(0) 
 
Table 1:  The optimal distribution of 100 ABMs in the linear case over 
Continuously Built Up Areas in the United States when each decoy displaces 0.5 
EMT ( 0.25 EMT).   
 
The exponential case is shown by a solid line in Figure 4.   The linear and 
exponential value functions have the same initial slope, so both cases have the same 
maximum casualties per EMT when there are no ABMs.  As the number of ABMs grows, 
so does the difference in casualty levels between the two cases. For any given level of 
interceptors, the attack is more spread out over CBUAs in the exponential case because 
of decreasing returns to the attacker at targets with high population density.  The defense 
is spread out similarly; when D=100, fifteen cities are defended, as opposed to 5 in the 



















Figure 4: Showing the effect of increasing numbers of ABMs when λ=0.5.  
Solid curve is the exponential case, dotted curve is the linear case. 
 
The introduction of ABMs, even thousands of them, succeeds in lowering the 
attacker’s return by only a factor of 2 or 3 over what it would be without them.  This low 
effectiveness is not due to imperfections in the ABMs, since they have all been assumed 
to function perfectly.  It is due, instead, to a profusion of attractive targets, together with 
the rule that (terminal) ABMs can only protect the target to which they are assigned.  A 
layered defense that includes flexible, midcourse interceptors would be more effective, 
assuming that the midcourse interceptors could not themselves be easily decoyed.  
In the free case, the ultimate (bound on the) damage caused by the attacker is 
Br(λ,D), which is of course proportional to B, the payload that attacks the terminal 
defenses.  The effect of any midcourse interceptors is essentially subtractive on B.  
Suppose, for example, that there are I midcourse interceptors, that effective midcourse 
decoys cost µ each in terms of payload, with µ presumably less than λ because 
exoatmospheric ABMs can be light, and that the initial payload is A.  Then, assuming that 
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the interceptors get soaked up by decoys, B = A - µI.  Damage to the targets would be 
additionally reduced, of course, if midcourse interceptors could discriminate RVs from 
decoys, or even if they could attack RVs at random. 
The reader who wishes to vary the assumptions made above, or to investigate the 
computations lying behind Figures 1-4, may wish to download BangSoak.xls, a workbook 
available at http://diana.or.nps.navy.mil/~washburn/ .  That workbook was used in 
making most of the computations reported above. 
 
Summary 
We have introduced a method for quickly approximating the effects of perfect 
terminal ABM systems against a mixed attack, under the assumption that the attacker is 
in control of which RVs are intercepted by the ABMs.  The method is simple enough to 
be implemented in a spreadsheet.  The effect of terminal defenses is highly dependent on 
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